July/August_AMP_Digital

A D V A N C E D M A T E R I A L S & P R O C E S S E S | J U L Y / A U G U S T 2 0 2 0 3 0 and explain the upcoming wave of com- plicated orders. Because closures were the only aluminum panels in produc- tion in North America at the time, most of the alloy and gauge combinations for F-150 were unique. Further, because X1 would be subjected to the full suite of corrosion and durability testing, Ford wanted to use the candidate surface treatments and the specified stamp- ing lubricant expected in production. As a final complication, there were no automotive lines qualified to apply DC2-90 and none of the candidate pre- treatment lines had the specialized, heat-stabilized electrostatic applica- tors that were recommended. These requirements dictated hiring and quali- fying external toll processors, a normal- ly lengthy process. Even if limited to X1, the project represented an enormous investment in time and resources at a time when the credibility of Ford and other automakers was not very strong. NOVELIS AND ALCOA WEIGH IN As a global supplier, Novelis was already focused on ABS, and having been Ford’s AIV partner for two de- cades, the company was prepared to support the project. But at that time, Novelis did not have the necessary heat treat and pretreatment lines available in North America. The difficulty came from Ford’s decision to use 6111 as a structur- al alloy, in gauges that reached 4.0 mm. Novelis facilities could not handle the alloy for gauges above 3.2 mm, even in Europe. The other minor difficulty was that its main center of ABS alloy de- velopment was in Europe. To produce material for Ford’s prototypes, Novelis would have to set up a logistics night- mare that would stay in place until new production facilities came online three years later. All the 6xxx metal would be rolled in Oswego, New York. Thin gaug- es below 1800 mm width could then be heat treated in Kingston, Ontario, while the other gauges crossed the Atlan- tic either to Sierre, Switzerland, for the wide-width thin gauges, while the thick- er gauges went to Nachterstedt, Ger- many. The coils then came back to the U.S., only to be shipped to a succession of processors for slitting, pretreatment, and lube application, then blanking, be- fore finally being shipped to Ford. In contrast, when Ford approached Alcoa, ABS was a secondary concern for the company. Alcoa’s Davenport facility had always been focused on aerospace products and the ABS market was seen as unreliable. The love affair between Alcoa and Audi stemming from the A8 project was long over. Alusuisse (now Novelis) had replaced them as the pre- ferred partner. Ford’s 1998 decision to retreat from aluminum closures short- ly after the launch of the Danville heat treat (HT) line had left painful mem- ories of the fickleness of the automo- tive market. Hood and deck lid demand kept the Danville HT line occupied and it could contain the added volume of the upcoming Tesla Model S. In short, they saw no need to invest in expensive new capacity. In addition, the alumi- num company was ill-prepared to take on a large effort: Technical resources were depleted, there was almost no in- terest in ABS at the Alcoa Technical Cen- ter (ATC), and alloy development had been pretty much sidelined after 2008. There were residual activities tweak- ing composition or process to deal with forming issues, but no new applications on the horizon. In Building C at the ATC near Pittsburgh, the metallurgists who had developed alloys 2008 and 6022 were either moved to other products or dealt with plant quality or custom- er issues. Support from the business was down to less than one person-year in metallurgy. Some minor forming or joining (RSW) activities continued in Building A. The A951 pretreatment that had been developed for the Audi A8 and tested by Ford a decade earlier was on the shelf, with no interest from automo- tive customers. The fact that demand was at an all-time low probably helped Ford’s case, and by December 2009, they were working out the commercial and supply chain issues with the aluminum sup- pliers. Increasingly intense technical meetings were held to reach a prelimi- nary consensus for material properties, as none of the participants had ever faced thick-gauge 6111. But the bigger discussion centered on convincing the two suppliers that Ford was serious- ly considering an aluminum F-150. The aluminum companies played along and started working on a timing plan to in- stall the required heat treat capacity, as- suming a mid-2014 start of production. They knew enough of the timing sequence of a Ford launch to recognize that the stamping plants would start the first of their preproduction runs in third quarter 2013, less than four years away. They gave themselves three months to commission the new lines, arriving at a tight, but feasible 42 months to design, order, and install the equipment. But the reality was that Ford would not of- ficially approve the program for anoth- er two years; technically, the program could still fail and be abandoned. The review to determine the technical and commercial viability of the program was at least five months away. In the most optimistic scenario, testing of the X0 prototypes would be complete just ahead of that date. In order to meet the launch dead- line, both companies needed to start designing the new lines immediately. Another issuewas that neither company could readily obtain the necessary fund- ing given their current financial difficul- ties. And as publicly traded companies, they would need to state the reason behind the decision to invest in added heat treat capacity for an automotive market that historically favored steel. Complicating the situation further was that no one had ever designed an alu- minum-intensive body structure out of 6111, and the design of the truck had not yet begun. The detailed mix of al- loys, gauges, and demand for pretreat- ment were all projections, guaranteed to change. The situation for Ford was not much different: Manufacturing had to start planning facilities, knowing that THE BIGGER DISCUSSION CENTERED ON CONVINCING THE TWO SUPPLIERS THAT FORD WAS SERIOUSLY CON- SIDERING AN ALUMINUM F-150.