September_AMP_Digital

A D V A N C E D M A T E R I A L S & P R O C E S S E S | S E P T E M B E R 2 0 1 9 2 7 the usually segregated scrap brought back to the ALS re-melt facility in Steg, Switzerland. Both companies had an in- terest in simplifying the recycling loop, and ALS introduced a recycling-friend- ly alloy called Ecodal 608 to replace the 5182 and the 6009 used on the A8. Audi adapted its designs to fit the new alloy’s formability profile. It was a win-win de- cision, with ALS avoiding the higher rolling costs of 5182 and Audi avoiding scrap segregation costs. The A2 was an engineering tri- umph, but it never caught on with cus- tomers. Production started in Novem- ber 1999, but it would take several months before it hit its stride, with first- year volume below 18,000 units. The second year reflected the manufactur- ing progress and arrival of the diesel engine, with sales reaching 51,517 units. Unfortunately for Audi, the buying pub- lic was not ready for a radically dif- ferent and premium small Audi that cost as much as a Mercedes A-Class. Sales declined every year and produc- tion stopped in August 2005, after only 176,377 units. By comparison, Mercedes would sell more than 1.1 million A-Class cars in its seven-year production run. JAPANESE ALUMINUM USE In Japan, Toyota’s surprise unveil- ing of a hybrid concept car at the 1995 Tokyo Motor Show had spurred Hon- da into action. When the Prius went on sale in Japan two years later, Honda was racing to be the first to offer a hy- brid car in the United States. Unlike the Prius, Honda’s Insight would use the electric motor only as an acceleration additional manufacturing step. While conventional high-pressure die cast- ings served as nodes for the extrusions, Honda included thixotropic die cast- ings for the rear outrigger, which dou- bled as rear suspension pick-up points. Honda claimed a 47% weight reduc- tion compared to the Civic three-door model, with an overall body weight of 162 kg. They also cut manufacturing costs in half compared to the NSX. Hon- da achieved its goal and the Insight was the first hybrid vehicle for sale in the U.S. in December 1999. But as a low- slung two-seater, its sales were quickly eclipsed by the four-door Prius. FORD’S ALUMINUM PLATFORMS While Audi and Honda were work- ing on their second-generation alu- minum body structures and targeting higher volumes, the product planners at Ford were evaluating different alter- natives for bringing an AIV to market. In 1997, Ford’s car side of the business was approaching the third year of a major reorganization, known as Ford 2000. It was CEO Alex Trotman’s ambi- tious plan to unify Ford’s European and North American activities under one set of shared car platforms. Jaguar was in- cluded in the plan: Its new mid-size sedan, the S-Type, was under develop- ment, sharing the DEW98 platform with the upcoming Lincoln LS. The replace- ment for the long-running XJ sedan (X300) was planned on a stretched ver- sion of the same platform. But, as the P2000 program progressed, some of the planners suggested that P2000 could provide the platform for a small Jaguar sedan that would compete with the fast selling BMW 3 Series. On October 15, 1997, they added a small AIV sedan to the product plan, codename X400, under the assumption that most of the base platform devel- opment had been done by P2000, mit- igating development costs and timing. Further, an AIV platformwould combine improved fuel economy and improved dynamic behavior—in a premium tech- nology package. Fortunately, the new S-Type, or X200 as it was known internally, had Audi A2, produced fromNovember 1999 until August 2005. assist and for regenerative braking. To further enhance the fuel economy, Hon- da had decided on an aluminum body structure. Whereas the Acura NSX (from Honda) was made mostly with stamped parts assembled with spot welds, thixo- tropic structural castings and extru- sions made up more than 40% of the weight of the Insight’s body in white (BIW) (Fig. 2). Fig. 2 — Comparison of body components by weight between Honda’s Insight and NSX models. Insight was targeted for high- er production volumes and like Audi, Honda focused on reducing the num- ber of components by 15%, resulting in 24% fewer welds. A major focus of the manufacturing development was di- mensional accuracy of the extrusions after bending. Rather than using hy- droforming for calibration, Honda R&D developed CAE programs to predict and understand the source of the vari- ability. It then optimized the process to improve dimensional accuracy by a fac- tor of five, eliminating the need for an